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Physicians use clinical guidelines to inform judgment about therapy. Clinical guidelines do
not address three important uncertainties: (1) uncertain relevance of tested populations to
the individual patient, (2) the patient’s uncertain preferences among possible outcomes,
and (3) uncertain subjective and ﬁnancial costs of intervention. Unreliable probabilistic
information is available for some of these uncertainties; no probabilities are available for
others. The uncertainties are in the values of parameters and in the shapes of functions.
We explore the usefulness of info-gap decision theory in patient-physician decision mak-
ing in managing cholesterol level using clinical guidelines. Info-gap models of uncertainty
provide versatile tools for quantifying diverse uncertainties. Info-gap theory provides two
decision functions for evaluating alternative therapies. The robustness function assesses
the conﬁdence—in light of uncertainties—in attaining acceptable outcomes. The oppor-
tuneness function assesses the potential for better-than-anticipated outcomes. Both func-
tions assist in forming preferences among alternatives. Hypothetical case studies
demonstrate that decisions using the guidelines and based on best estimates of the
expected utility are sometimes, but not always, consistent with robustness and opportune-
ness analyses. The info-gap analysis provides guidance when judgment suggests that a
deviation from the guidelines would be productive. Finally, analysis of uncertainty can help
resolve ambiguous situations.
 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The emergence of probability theory in the early 17th century brought to the fore the diversity of categories of knowl-
edge. On the one hand the astronomer, for instance, could aspire to certain, almost apodeictic, knowledge of the laws of
celestial motion. In contrast, the physician could at best make judgments of plausible truth. The deductive certainty of Aris-
totelian logic was inadequate for the inferences made in the ‘low’ sciences of medicine, alchemy, etc., and new modes of
inference for uncertain induction began to emerge [1].
The 20th century saw a diversiﬁcation of models of uncertainty, reﬂecting a broadening diversity of categories of knowl-
edge which underlie judgment and inference: Linguistic knowledge; observed frequencies; hunches and beliefs; microscopic
or fundamental quantum randomness as distinct from the macroscopic randomness of ensembles; randomness which arises
from partial knowledge of a deterministic system (‘‘Like the queen of England, determinism reigns but does not govern”
[2, p. 63]); ignorance one is aware of, and ignorance one is ignorant of.
Great strides have been made in the much needed synthesis of a coherent system for the diverse types of knowledge and
their attendant uncertainties [3]. Nonetheless, ‘‘As our island of knowledge grows, so does the shore of our ignorance” [4]. In. All rights reserved.
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measure-theoretic formulations, has not yet been accomplished [6, p. 37].
Once again, as in the 17th century, we ﬁnd that medical decisions confront us with heterogeneous uncertainties for which
we are incompletely prepared. Clinical trials are rendered to the practitioner as probabilistic functions, expressing outcome-
likelihoods under speciﬁed conditions. However, as we will explain in Section 2, these probability estimates can be subject to
uncertainties for which we have no probabilistic information. Furthermore, patients are challenged to quantify their antic-
ipated utility (or dis-utility) of future outcomes of treatments with which they have no experience. The enlightened physi-
cian assists the patient to fold these anticipated utilities into the selection of a therapy. However, these anticipations are
fraught with severe uncertainty as we will discuss in Section 4.1. For these uncertainties we have limited or no probability
models. The challenge is to develop decision tools and evaluate the quality of these tools. The diversity of types of informa-
tion, and of the associated uncertainties, has impeded the development of generic and universal decision methodologies.
This paper illustrates a methodology for quantifying severe non-probabilistic uncertainties, for combining uncertainties
of different types, and for then using these results to support a medical decision. We make no claim for the optimality of this
methodology, which is based on info-gap decision theory [5]. Indeed it is a formidable task to deﬁne and evaluate the opti-
mality of a decision strategy, which is not a goal of this paper. However, the development of concepts and criteria of opti-
mality is supported by the study of diverse methodologies. We contribute to this task by offering a methodology—info-gap
theory—which is different from the many existing measure-theoretic techniques.
In Section 2 we review the role of clinical guidelines in medical decision making, and discuss the attendant uncertainties.
In Section 3 we present a standard probabilistic model for cholesterol risk assessment which underlies medical intervention.
In Section 4 we formulate the info-gap models of the relevant diverse uncertainties. We then formulate the info-gap robust-
ness and opportuneness functions which underlie the choice of an intervention. In Section 5 we apply the info-gap analysis
to four plausible clinical cases. In Section 6 we discuss the implications of our work for medical guidelines. We conclude in
Section 7 with a methodological comparison of info-gap theory with other methods.2. Clinical guidelines
The dissemination of clinical guidelines has signiﬁcantly impacted medical practice. Inaugurated as algorithms for com-
mon problems in clinical medicine, guidelines now encompass all aspects of medical practice. The National Guideline Clear-
inghouse indexes over 2100 guidelines [7]. Mehta et al. [8] conclude: ‘‘Improved application of existing therapies, directed by
evidence-based guidelines, may offer immediate savings of life and function to patients with cardiovascular disease.” Frei
et al. [9] report signiﬁcant improvement in clinical outcomes from ‘‘guideline-concordant antibiotic therapy” in treating
community-acquired pneumonia.
But how well do clinical guidelines deal with the diverse uncertainties facing both patient and clinician? How can patient
and physician assess these uncertainties and incorporate this assessment in their decisions? This paper studies the manage-
ment of low density lipid (LDL) cholesterol as a framework for illustrating the construction of non-probabilistic info-gap
models of uncertainty. We consider diverse types of uncertain information—some probabilistic, some not—which must be
combined in assessing and choosing among therapeutic alternatives. We deﬁne and construct robustness and opportuneness
functions to support these tasks.
A criticism of clinical guidelines is that they constitute ‘‘cookbookmedicine” and externally applied restrictions on clinical
judgment and autonomy [10]. Advocates of guidelines also stress that ‘‘it is important to tailor treatment to the needs of each
individual patient” [11].
In addition, guidelines do not readily facilitate consideration of three challenging uncertainties which physicians regu-
larly face.
First, guidelines are based on clinical trials with populations which may not reliably reﬂect the individual patient. Both
patient and physician are sometimes quite uncertain about the relevance of the clinical trials to their speciﬁc case. Greenﬁeld
et al. [12] note that randomized control trials, which underlie clinical guidelines, typically enroll patients with less severe
disease and exclude older patients, making the resulting guidelines of uncertain applicability to the excluded populations.
Feinstein and Horwitz [13] warn against the prevalence of randomized clinical trials in which ‘‘the data do not include many
types of treatments or patients seen in clinical practice”. Morimoto et al. [14] note that clinical guidelines, developed in the
U.S. for use of aspirin in primary prevention of cardiovascular events, need modiﬁcation before application in Japan.
McLaughlin [15] reports the conclusions of a roundtable discussion of implications of heterogeneity of treatment effects
(HTE). He concludes that, due to HTE, and especially in the absence of ‘‘sound data”, ‘‘care has to be individualized, using
the clinician’s best judgment regarding available treatment options.”
The second challenge is that guideline recommendations do not account for the individual patient’s uncertain preferences
among possible outcomes of treatment, especially adverse outcomes unfamiliar to the patient.
The third challenge, related to the second, is that guidelines often fail to account for the cost of intervention, either the
subjective cost of lifestyle change or the quantitative ﬁnancial cost.
This paper presents a quantitative decision-theoretic methodology for addressing these uncertainties when using clinical
guidelines. Quantitative decision theory underlies computer-based clinical decision-support. Availability of decision-support
technology has resulted in substantial increase in physician compliance with clinical guidelines [16].
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found to be consistent with the info-gap analysis of uncertainty in a series of plausible clinical examples. The examples illus-
trate how physician judgment to deviate from the guidelines can be supported, or refuted, by the analysis of uncertainty, as
well as how patient preferences can be incorporated in the decision process.
This paper employs info-gap decision theory [5], which has been applied in a large array of decision problems under se-
vere uncertainty, including biological conservation [17,18], resource management [19], ethology [20], statistical testing [21],
homeland security [22], engineering design [23–27] and fault diagnosis [28], project management [29,30], portfolio invest-
ment [31] and conﬂict resolution [32].3. Cholesterol management and the LDL risk model
Alteration of cholesterol concentration is a common intervention in primary and secondary prevention of heart disease.
Population studies, like the longitudinal Framingham study [33], demonstrate that cholesterol level is a major risk factor for
cardiovascular events, and that alterations in cholesterol level can reduce the incidence of stroke and heart attacks.
Debate continues about altering LDL and high density lipid (HDL) cholesterol levels. Brindle et al. [34] review the appli-
cability of the Framingham data to diverse populations, concluding that caution is needed in applying the Framingham score
to some sub-populations such as lower socio-economic groups. Kostis [35] suggests that the 10-point cardiac risk assess-
ment based on the Framingham study may not deal adequately with some sub-populations such as young women. Pharma-
cological interventions such as statins are costly and have measurable toxicity, especially for young people facing life-long
treatment [35]. Some patients resist life-long intervention if it is only ameliorative. Robson [36] observes that there ‘‘is most
uncertainty about treating the many people at intermediate risk . . . [which] can turn large numbers of people into lifelong
patients.” Finally, no clinical study is ultimately deﬁnitive. For instance, Grundy et al. [37] report on clinical trials which sug-
gest some modiﬁcations of the earlier Framingham study.
The patient considering intervention is uncertain how he or she matches the study population. The Framingham study,
which is the canonical prototype of all major risk models to date, examined free-living, healthy, middle-aged white subur-
banites west of Boston [33], and may not be applicable to, for example, an Hispanic in Chicago or Lima. Although the appli-
cation may be valid, patients and physicians are legitimately uncertain. The patient may also be uncertain regarding the
future utility or disutility of the treatment outcome.
Wilson et al. [33] estimate the probability of a cardiac event based on the patient’s condition which is characterized by a
vector, c, of known, non-negative numbers. c1 and c2 equal the patient’s age and age-squared. c13 and c14 each equal 1 if the
patient has diabetes or smokes, and equal zero otherwise. Elements 3–7 specify the patient’s HDL level, where c2þi ¼ 1 for
patients in the ith HDL group. Only one of c3; . . . ; c7 is non-zero. Elements 8–12 specify the patient’s blood pressure group,
where c7þi ¼ 1 for patients in the ith group. Only one of c8; . . . ; c12 is non-zero. Elements 15–19 specify the patient’s LDL level,
where c14þi ¼ 1 for patients in the ith LDL group. Only one of c15; . . . ; c19 is non-zero. The non-zero element from among
c15; . . . ; c19 indicates which therapeutic intervention has been chosen.
The probability of developing coronary heart disease (CHD) over a 10-year period, for members of the ‘th LDL group, is
based on the Framingham study [33]:P‘ðcÞ ¼ 1 Se
LG ð1ÞS ¼ 0:90017 for men and S ¼ 0:9628 for women, and G ¼ 3:00069 for men and G ¼ 9:914136 for women. L ¼ cTc. The sub-
script ‘ indicates that c14þ‘ ¼ 1 while the other elements of c15; . . . ; c19 equal zero. The best estimate of the vector c is ~c,
shown in Table 6. The estimates of S, G and ~c were obtained in [33] by a prospective study of 2489 men and 2856 women
aged 30–74 at baseline with 12 years of follow-up. During these 12 years 383 men and 227 women developed CHD. Standard
errors of these estimates are not available in [33]. The Framingham study is based on a middle-aged white American pop-
ulation. The practicing physician may be uncertain to what extent Eq. (1) is relevant to a patient who belongs to another sub-
population, either ethnically or due to idiosyncratic medical history.4. Info-gap analysis with uncertain expected utility
In Section 4.1 we discuss several info-gap models for representing different types of uncertainty: uncertainty in the
parameters of a probability function, uncertainty in estimated utility coefﬁcients, and uncertainty in the shape of a utility
function. In Section 4.2 we discuss the info-gap robustness and opportuneness functions and explain how they are used
to choose among the alternative therapies.
4.1. Uncertain expected utility
Many utility and quality-of-life functions are used in medical decision making [38]. We will use expected utility, which is
a generally accepted, versatile, and powerful method for exploiting the probability model developed in the Framingham
study, though one could use other quality-of-life functions such as quality adjusted life years (QALYs).
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elementary events. In our case, the patient has positive utility uh from health, negative utility (disutility) ue from a cardiac
event, and negative utility uið‘Þ from the cost of intervention to bring the patient’s LDL concentration to the ‘th level. While
uh must be positive and ue must be negative, they need not have equal magnitude: many people have asymmetric utilities
for good and bad outcomes. The elicitation and combination of these utilities can be done in many different ways, (see for
instance Keeny and Raiffa [39] and Keeny [40]). Our discussion is independent of how this is done. In any case, uh, ue and ui
are utilities which are calibrated subjectively in linguistic terms. The patient’s estimates of these utilities are based on
introspection, conversation with family, friends and medical professionals, and perhaps formal supervised elicitation.
The elicitation process establishes subjective meaning for the patient of different values of utility. That is, positive utility
in different numerical ranges is related to various linguistic descriptors such as ‘good’, ‘very good’, etc. Likewise, negative
utilities in various ranges have descriptors such as ‘poor’ or ‘not too bad’. The formulation and elicitation of these estimates
is not easy or trivial, and these estimates are clearly highly uncertain. Our primary concern, however, is not with the pro-
cess by which these estimates are formed, but in managing the considerable uncertainty which accompanies these
estimates.
The expected utility is the average of uh and ue, weighted by P‘ðcÞ, plus the ﬁxed disutility of intervention, uið‘Þ. Denote
these three utilities collectively with the vector u. Expected utility for the ‘th LDL level is:E‘ðc;uÞ ¼ P‘ðcÞue þ ½1 P‘ðcÞuh þ uið‘Þ ð2Þ
uh, ue and uið‘Þ are uncertain: people poorly predict future feelings. P‘ðcÞ is uncertain because of uncertain relevance of the
population study to the individual. These uncertainties are information gaps between what we do know, and need to know, in
order to dispel reasonable doubt. Info-gap models quantify these uncertainties [5]. Roughly, uh, ue, uið‘Þ and P‘ðcÞ are esti-
mated, but we do not know how wrong those estimates are. An info-gap model of uncertainty quantiﬁes the unbounded
range of possibilities which this entails, without using probability distributions or presuming knowledge of a worst case.
We now consider uncertainty quantiﬁcations for P‘ðcÞ, ue, uh and uið‘Þ.
Uncertain probability. The probability P‘ðcÞ is uncertain because the coefﬁcients c are uncertain. (One could also con-
sider uncertainty in the form of the function, but we will not explore that here.) Our best statistical estimate of the c-coef-
ﬁcients is ~c, Table 6. However, those coefﬁcients are estimated for a speciﬁc sub-population (middle-aged white American
suburbanites) and we don’t know how different the coefﬁcients would be for some other sub-population from another ethnic
group or with speciﬁc medical histories not represented by the Framingham study. We are not able to identify a worst case
(greatest deviation), nor do we have a probability distribution for the error of ~c. We will represent this uncertainty with an
info-gap model: an unbounded family of nested sets of possible c vectors. The nesting parameter of this family of sets, de-
noted by a, is referred to as the horizon of uncertainty, which is an unspeciﬁed non-negative real number. As the name im-
plies, the horizon of uncertainty expresses the level of uncertainty. Nonetheless, it is axiomatically different from a
probability, and does not obey the Kolmogorov axioms of a probability measure [41].
We now formulate an info-gap model for uncertainty in ~c.
In some situations one might know a standard error, ri, of the estimate ~ci, in which case one can deﬁne qi ¼ ri=j~cij for all
~ci’s which are included in the regression. Those terms which are zero by deﬁnition (marked ‘w’ or ‘’ in Table 6) do not vary.
For these terms we arbitrarily deﬁne qi ¼ 1, which has no impact on the numerical results. In our numerical examples, based
on the Framingham study [33], we do not know standard errors. We have no information with which to differentiate be-
tween coefﬁcients. Hence we deﬁne qi ¼ 1, which means that the available range of fractional-error is the same for each
coefﬁcient of the terms in the linear combination, at any horizon of uncertainty. Note that we do not know the value of
the horizon of uncertainty, which may be different for different coefﬁcients.
We now deﬁne a fractional-error info-gap model [5] for uncertainty in the ci’s:Uða; ~cÞ ¼ c : ci  ~cij j 6 aqij~cij; i ¼ 1; . . . ;19f g; aP 0 ð3Þ
Like all info-gap models of uncertainty,Uða; ~cÞ is a family of nested sets of possible realizations of the uncertain quantity, c in
this case. In the absence of uncertainty (when a ¼ 0) the set Uð0; ~cÞ contains only the estimated vector, ~c. The set Uða; ~cÞ
becomes more inclusive as the horizon of uncertainty, a, increases. The horizon of uncertainty, a, is unknown, so this is
an unbounded family of nested sets of c-vectors. We have estimates, ~c, but we are unable to specify maximum deviations
of these estimates from the true values, and we know no probability distribution for the error of ~c.
Uncertain utility coefﬁcients ue and uh. The individual’s personal utility coefﬁcients, ue and uh, reﬂect introspection, con-
versations with family, friends and physicians, social norms and constraints, and so on. (We will consider the disutility of
intervention, uið‘Þ, separately.) The choice of ue and uh is highly uncertain. Whatever method the patient uses to estimate
his or her utilities, we denote the estimates by the vector ~u ¼ ð~ue; ~uhÞ. ue is a disutility and thus must be negative, while
uh must be positive. The same holds for the best estimates, ~ue and ~uh. We have no information about how differently the
patient might choose the utility coefﬁcients in other circumstances, for instance following experience of a subsequent car-
diac event. Lacking more detailed information about the uncertainty in the utility coefﬁcients, u, we adopt the following frac-
tional-error info-gap model. Let us deﬁne the following function: hðxÞ ¼ x if xP 0, and hðxÞ ¼ 0 if x < 0. The info-gap model
for uncertainty in the utility coefﬁcients is:Uuða; ~uÞ ¼ u : ð1þ aÞ~ue 6 ue 6 hð1 aÞ~ue;hð1 aÞ~uh 6 uh 6 ð1þ aÞ~uhf g; aP 0 ð4Þ
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a ¼ 0) the set contains only the estimate, ~u. The set Uuða; ~uÞ becomes more inclusive as the horizon of uncertainty, a, in-
creases, and a is unbounded so there is no known worst case.
Uncertain disutility of intervention, uið‘Þ. The disutility of intervention, uið‘Þ, is highly uncertain. The monetary cost var-
ies with patient condition [42], full lifetime costs are difﬁcult to identify and evaluate [43], and the impact of lifestyle change
is hard to evaluate beforehand. It is hard to identify individuals who currently are free of disease but would develop disease
in the future if intervention is not taken now [44]. Utility coefﬁcients can be elicited from patients who are not diagnosed
with a disease by describing the disease to the patient. However, the patient’s assessments of utility may depend on knowing
a positive diagnosis or not. In short, there are many sources of uncertainty in the patient’s utility. One can formulate various
different plausible disutility functions, and the large attendant uncertainty can be represented with an info-gap model as we
now explain.
Let ‘c denote the patient’s current LDL level. The disutility, uið‘Þ, of moving to the ‘th LDL level will increase as the dif-
ference between ‘c and ‘ increases. Furthermore, the disutility of intervention is estimated to be proportional to the spread
between the (positive) utility of health, uh, and the (negative) utility of a cardiac event, ue. A plausible (though uncertain)
model for the disutility of intervention would be:~uið‘Þ ¼ j‘ ‘cju0 ð5Þ
where u0 is the following negative value:u0 ¼ ð
~uh  ~ueÞf
4
ð6ÞThe term ~uh  ~ue expresses the spread in estimated utility between health (~uh, which is positive) and disease (~ue, which is
negative). Large damage of a cardiac event makes ~ue very negative and the spread very large. u0 (which is negative) is a dis-
utility that is large when the damage is large. The ‘4’ in the denominator is the greatest possible value of j‘ ‘cj. Note that if
f ¼ 0 then there is no disutility of intervention, while a large value of f implies large estimated disutility.
The function ~uið‘Þ in Eq. (5) is plausible, but we don’t have much actual evidence that the dependence is really linear, or
for a speciﬁc value of u0. In short, the magnitude and shape of this disutility function is highly uncertain. We will now for-
mulate an info-gap model for uncertainty in this disutility function.
An info-gap model expresses the unknown deviation of the true function, uið‘Þ, from the plausible function ~uið‘Þ. We re-
quire that uið‘Þ be negative. We are considering uncertainty in the actual shape of the function, not just in its parameters. We
use a ‘‘slope-bound” model, in which all the functions are negative, reach zero when ‘ ¼ ‘c, and the fractional-error in the
slope is unknown and unbounded. This implies that cost will increase with the magnitude of the intervention, though the
slope (and magnitude) of the cost function is uncertain. u0ið‘Þ is the slope of the disutility function, which is negative for
‘ > ‘c and non-negative for ‘ 6 ‘c. Explicitly, the info-gap model is the following unbounded family of nested sets of
functions:Uiða; ~uiÞ ¼ uið‘Þ : uið‘cÞ ¼ 0; uið‘Þ 6 0; 8‘; ð1þ aÞu0 6 u0ið‘Þ 6 hð1 aÞu0; ‘ > ‘c;

hð1 aÞu0 6 u0ið‘Þ 6 ð1þ aÞu0; ‘ < ‘c

; aP 0 ð7ÞRecall that u0 < 0, as deﬁned in Eq. (6).
4.2. Robustness and opportuneness
We now deﬁne robustness and opportuneness functions, and explain how they assist patient and physician in choosing
an LDL level.
Robustness. If we conﬁdently knew P‘ðcÞ, uh, ue and uið‘Þ, then we could conﬁdently choose the LDL level, ‘, to maximize
the expected utility, E‘ðc;uÞ. However, P‘ðcÞ, uh, ue and uið‘Þ are highly uncertain. Consequently we evaluate how reliably we
can obtain an acceptable outcome with different ‘’s. Conversely, what constitutes an acceptable outcome is inﬂuenced by
how conﬁdent we are in attaining that outcome with a chosen LDL level, ‘.
Ec denotes the lowest expected utility the patient would accept. Neither ‘ nor Ec are speciﬁed, and the patient may be
unsure about what Ec value to require. We use a robustness concept [5] to choose ‘ and evaluate different Ec’s.
We have estimates—likely to be off the mark—of uh, ue, uið‘Þ and P‘ðcÞ. We wish to choose an LDL level, ‘, for which ade-
quate utility, Ec, will be achieved even if these estimates err greatly.
The robustness of the ‘th LDL level is the greatest horizon of uncertainty, a, up to which expected utility E‘ðc;uÞ is guar-














Y. Ben-Haim et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 50 (2009) 1046–1065 1051The robustness function a^ð‘; EcÞ establishes preferences over the options. ‘ is preferred over ‘0, at critical aspiration Ec, if we
are more robust to the uncertainty with ‘ than with ‘0. Succinctly:‘ r ‘0 if a^ð‘; EcÞ > a^ð‘0; EcÞ ð9Þ
The decision strategy implied by this preference ordering satisﬁces the expected utility and ranks the alternatives based on
the robustness. For brevity, this strategy is called robust-satisﬁcing.
We show how to conveniently evaluate the robustness function in Appendix A.
Interpreting robustness curves. We will use plots of robustness, a^ð‘; EcÞ, vs. expected utility, Ec, to choose therapeutic
intervention. We now explain how to interpret these plots, and illustrate that a choice of ‘ can usually be made with only
a rough idea of the required critical utility, Ec. Two points are characteristic of all robustness curves, illustrated in Fig. 1.
First, the negative slope of the robustness curve in Fig. 1 expresses the trade-off of robustness to uncertainty, against the
expected utility which can be reliably anticipated. Greater expected utility is invariably associated with lower robustness to
error in the underlying models. This intuitive idea—that high aspirations are more vulnerable to surprises or errors than low
aspirations—is quantiﬁed by the negative slope.
Second, the robustness curve reaches the horizontal axis at some value of expected utility, as shown by the solid dot in
Fig. 1. The robustness is zero at this value of utility. Signiﬁcantly, this value of expected utility is precisely the value obtained
with the estimated models and data. In other words, the best estimate of the expected utility has no robustness against error
in the models and data upon which that estimate depends. Best estimates exploit all available information, without regard to
their potential error, so the estimated utility has no immunity against error in this information. Only less optimistic esti-
mates—for lower expected utility—have positive robustness, which returns us again to the previous point: the trade-off be-
tween robustness and utility.
We now examine Figs. 2 and 3 to understand how robustness curves are used to evaluate and choose among alternative
interventions.Fig. 1. Properties of robustness curves.
Fig. 2. Preference for intervention 1.
Fig. 3. Preference reversal between therapies.
1052 Y. Ben-Haim et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 50 (2009) 1046–1065Fig. 2 shows the robustness curves of two different therapeutic interventions, denoted ‘1’ and ‘2’. Option ‘1’ is more robust
than ‘2’ at all levels of expected utility with positive robustness. Since more robustness is preferable over less, option ‘1’ is
unambiguously favored over option ‘2’. Note that this is the same choice as the guideline recommendation based on the esti-
mated utilities of these two options (represented by the points at which the curves meet the horizontal axis).
Fig. 3 shows a different situation, in which the robustness curves for two different therapeutic interventions intersect at
some value of expected utility, E, and robustness, a^. More robustness is better than less robustness. However, when utility
is sacriﬁced for robustness, with it goes the aspiration for the higher results promised by the model. If utility in excess of E is
needed, then option ‘2’ is preferred. This is the same choice as the guideline recommendation based on the estimated utilities
of these two options. We must recognize, however, that the trade-off between robustness and utility implies that utility in
excess of E will be obtained only with robustness in the lower part of the robustness scale, below robustness a^. If greater
conﬁdence (greater robustness) is needed, and the patient and physician are willing to obtain this robustness premium by
relaxing the aspiration for utility to a value below E, then alternative ‘1’ is preferred. In this case the crossing of the robust-
ness curves has caused the decision maker to change preference from the guideline option. The decision maker does not need
to choose a speciﬁc value of either critical utility, Ec, or robustness, a^, in order to gain the advantage of this formulation.
Only a choice of the required range of these values is needed.
Opportuneness. Robustness against failing to achieve acceptable utility is only one part of managing uncertainty. Uncer-
tainty also entails opportunities for windfall, that is, a beneﬁt or outcome better than anticipated [5]. A more opportune
choice is preferred, though this may disagree with the robustness preferences.
Ew denotes a large and highly desirable level of utility, a windfall, larger than the critical utility Ec and larger than the
utility based on the estimated models. The opportuneness of the ‘th LDL level is the lowest horizon of uncertainty, a, at













ð10ÞThe opportuneness function is the lowest level of uncertainty which enables better-than-anticipated results, Ew. If this level
of uncertainty is large, then better-than-anticipated results (windfalls) will require extraordinary circumstances; if this level
of uncertainty is small, then windfall is possible (though not guaranteed) even in nearly ordinary situations. Thus, a small
value of b^ð‘;EwÞmeans that windfall is feasible, and decision ‘ is opportune. A large value of b^ð‘;EwÞmeans that great uncer-
tainty is needed in order to enable windfall as large as Ew. We can summarize this by saying that b^ð‘;EwÞ assesses the degree
to which intervention ‘ is immune to windfall outcomes: large b^ð‘; EwÞ implies high immunity to windfall and low oppor-
tuneness; small b^ð‘; EwÞ implies low immunity and high opportuneness.
In short, the opportuneness function, b^ð‘;EwÞ, is the immunity against windfall. Since windfall is desirable, small values of
b^ð‘; EwÞ (low immunity to windfall) are preferable over large values. Hence the opportuneness function establishes prefer-
ences over the options. ‘ is preferred over ‘0, at windfall aspiration Ew, if we are more prone to favorable uncertainty with
‘ than with ‘0. Thus ‘ is preferred over ‘0 if b^ð‘;EwÞ is less than b^ð‘0; EwÞ:‘ o ‘0 if b^ð‘; EwÞ < b^ ‘0; Ewð Þ ð11Þ
The decision strategy implied by this preference ordering attempts to facilitate windfalls (which we will refer to as ‘windfall-
ing’), and ranks the alternatives based on the opportuneness. For brevity, this strategy is called opportune-windfalling.
The preference rankings in Eqs. (9) and (11) may or may not agree.
We show how to conveniently evaluate the opportuneness function in Appendix A.
Interpreting opportuneness curves. Fig. 4 shows a typical opportuneness curve, illustrating the analog of the two
robustness properties described in Fig. 1. The positive slope in Fig. 4 expresses the trade-off between opportuneness and cer-
tainty: high windfall aspiration (for larger-than-expected utility) is feasible only at great ambient uncertainty. Likewise, theFig. 4. Properties of opportuneness curves.
Fig. 5. Using opportuneness and robustness.
Y. Ben-Haim et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 50 (2009) 1046–1065 1053opportuneness curve hits the horizontal axis precisely at the estimated utility: no surprise is needed in order to enable
(though not guarantee) the expected outcome.
Since decision makers are usually risk averse, the opportuneness curves are usually used to resolve situations where
robustness is ambiguous, as illustrated in Fig. 5. The decreasing curves on the left of the ﬁgure are the robustness curves
for two alternative interventions. These curves intersect at expected utility E. Consequently, if utility around E is required,
consideration of robustness does not resolve the choice between these options, since the two options are equally robust. The
opportuneness curves—with positive slope—do not intersect one another in this case. Since a small value for b^ð‘;EwÞ is pre-
ferred, we see that option 2 is more opportune than option 1, suggesting a resolution of the robustness-ambiguity in favor of
option 2.
5. Results: four case studies
In this section we illustrate the info-gap decision analysis with uncertainty in the probability of a cardiac event, the pa-
tient’s utility coefﬁcients for disease and health, and the cost of intervention. We consider four hypothetical, but realistic,
case studies.
Cases 1 and 2, Sections 5.1 and 5.2, compare the decision analysis for a middle-aged male with difference in HDL level,
blood pressure, smoking and diabetes.
Case 3, Section 5.3, looks at the effect of age, with other variables unchanged.
Case 4, Section 5.4, considers a female of age 55.
5.1. Case 1
Example 1 is a male, aged 55, group-5 HDL, group-1 blood pressure (see Table 1), non-diabetic non-smoker whose pre-
intervention LDL level is group 5. The info-gap analysis examines various estimated (but uncertain) costs of intervention,
together with uncertainty in the probability of a cardiac event and uncertainty in the patient’s utility coefﬁcients for disease
and health.
We will discuss robustness and opportuneness curves (Figs. 6 and 7) for transition to various LDL levels ‘. Before doing so
we explain how these curves are constructed.
The patient’s utility coefﬁcients, ~uh, ~ue and ~uið‘Þ are estimated by one or another method as described in Section 4.1. One
outcome of this estimation process is that the patient develops subjective understanding of the meaning, in terms of linguis-
tic descriptors such as ‘poor’ or ‘pretty good’, of different ranges of utility on the horizontal axes of these ﬁgures. The central
task of the uncertainty analysis is to address the following questions. First, for any given intervention, what levels of utility
can be reliably attained; this is based on the robustness function. Second, for any given intervention, what levels of utility can
be aspired to as potential windfall; this exploits the opportuneness function.
The robustness and opportuneness functions are evaluated for the individual patient based on the patient’s estimated
utility coefﬁcients. Thus the curves are individualized to the patient, expressing the preferences, and the uncertainties, forTable 1
HDL-C, blood pressure and LDL-C groups. The systolic and diastolic pressures deﬁning the blood pressure groups are deﬁned in Table 1 of Wilson [33].
Group HDL-C (mg/dL) Blood pressure LDL-C (mg/dL)
1 <35 Optimal <100
2 35–44 Normal 100–129
3 45–49 High normal 130–159
4 50–59 Stage I hypertension 160–189
5 P60 Stage II–IV hypertension P190
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Fig. 6. Case 1. Robustness and opportuneness vs. desired utility for case in Section 5.1. Patient’s estimated utilities are ~u ¼ ½1; 0:5. q is the unit vector.
‘c ¼ 5. f ¼ 0 (left), f ¼ 0:1 (right).
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Fig. 7. Case 1. Robustness and opportuneness vs. desired utility for case in Section 5.1. Patient’s estimated utilities are ~u ¼ ½1; 0:5. q is the unit vector.
‘c ¼ 5. f ¼ 0:2 (left), f ¼ 0:4 (right).
1054 Y. Ben-Haim et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 50 (2009) 1046–1065that individual. The evaluation of robustness and opportuneness is speciﬁed mathematically in the appendix. A different
robustness and opportuneness curve is calculated for each possible intervention. Thus, since ﬁve LDL levels are possible,
there are ﬁve robustness and ﬁve opportuneness curves.
The disutility of intervention, uið‘Þ, for moving to the ‘th LDL level is estimated to increase as the difference between ‘ and
the patient’s current LDL level, ‘c, increases. Furthermore, the disutility is estimated to be proportional to a fraction f of the
utility of health uh minus the disutility of a cardiac event ue. These subjective estimates, however, are highly uncertain.
Figs. 6 and 7 show robustness and opportuneness curves for transition to various LDL levels ‘. The left frame of Fig. 6 is the
case of no cost at any level of uncertainty ðf ¼ 0Þ, while the right frame of Fig. 7 shows an uncertain cost estimated as 40% of
the beneﬁt ðf ¼ 0:4Þ. The other frames of Figs. 6 and 7 show intermediate values (f ¼ 0:1 and f ¼ 0:2) for the estimated cost
of intervention.
The robustness curves in the left frame of Fig. 6 are for the case of no cost of intervention. The nominal preferences, based
on the best estimates—at which the robustness is zero as explained in connection with Fig. 1—are for decreasing the LDL
level as much as possible. Level 1 is preferred over level 2 (represented by ‘‘”). Levels 2 and 3 are identical (represented
by ‘‘”), since their estimated c coefﬁcients are essentially the same (Table 6). However, they are both preferred over level
4, which is preferred over level 5. We can succinctly represent these preferences as:1  2  3  4  5 ð12Þ
Y. Ben-Haim et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 50 (2009) 1046–1065 1055The robustness to uncertainty for each of these options, for attaining the corresponding estimated utility, is zero, as ex-
plained in Fig. 1. Consequently these options can not be depended on to reliably result in the corresponding utilities. How-
ever, the preference ranking is the same at every level of robustness up to 100% ða^ ¼ 1Þ, since the robustness curves have not
crossed one another up to robustness of 1. The situation here is like Fig. 2, in which the robustness curves do not cross one
another. It is noteworthy, though, that levels 4 and 5 have substantially less utility than lower LDL levels at robustness of 0.5
and greater. This is unlike the situation at zero-robustness, in which the utility-margin between the different options is
small. At robustness of a^ ¼ 1 the robustness curve for ‘ ¼ 1 crosses the curves for levels 2 and 3, thus reversing the prefer-
ence among these levels if larger robustness is required, noting that the corresponding utility is quite low compared to the
nominal utility.
The opportuneness curves in the lefthand frame of Fig. 6 are ordered nominally, and rapidly converge. This indicates that
considerations of opportuneness do not promote one intervention over another.
The situation is very different in the righthand frame of Fig. 6, for which the estimated (though uncertain) cost of inter-
vention is 10% of the estimated beneﬁt, so f ¼ 0:1. Now the nominal (zero-robustness) preferences are the reverse of the no-






0.45  4  3  2  1 ð13Þ
The curve for ‘ ¼ 5 has not shifted between the two frames of Fig. 6 because the patient’s pre-intervention LDL level is ‘c ¼ 5.
However the other curves have shifted to the right, and changed in shape, as a result of the cost of intervention. These nom-
inal, zero-robustness preferences are weak. However, there is substantial crossing of robustness curves at low robustness
(around a^  0:2), causing preference-reversal among the interventions as explained in connection with Fig. 3. At 50% robust-
ness ða^ ¼ 0:5Þ there is strong preference against level 5, despite the intervention cost, while the preferences among the other
levels is not large. More precisely, the preferences at 50% robustness are:ð3  1Þ  2  4  5 ð14Þ
where the parentheses indicate that the preferences between levels 3 and 1 are weak.
A similar picture emerges when we consider higher estimated cost of intervention, f ¼ 0:2 and f ¼ 0:4 in Fig. 7. The re-
sults of these four ﬁgures are summarized in Table 2.
Before examining Table 2, consider the righthand frame of Fig. 7 at moderate robustness ða^ ¼ 0:5Þ. The robustness curves
for the two most attractive interventions, levels 4 and 5, cross at a^ ¼ 0:5, indicating indifference between these two options,
where level 5 implies no intervention since this is the patient’s pre-intervention LDL level. However, examining the oppor-
tuneness curves in this ﬁgure shows that remaining at level 5 is more opportune for windfall outcome than moving to level
4. This is an instance where the opportuneness analysis can be used to resolve a robustness-tie between options, as discussed
in connection with Fig. 5.
A clear picture emerges from Table 2 for this individual, whose pre-intervention LDL concentration is at level 5. If there is
no cost for intervention ðf ¼ 0Þ, then the nominal, zero robustness ða^ ¼ 0Þ, preference is for reducing the LDL concentration
to level 1. If there is any cost to intervention ðf P 0:1Þ, then the nominal (no-robustness) preferences call for no intervention.
However, requiring moderate robustness to uncertainty ða^ ¼ 0:5Þ changes the picture, and intervention to lower the LDL to
the 3rd level is indicated at moderate cost (f ¼ 0:1 or f ¼ 0:2). At high cost, f ¼ 0:4, levels 4 and 5 are equivalent in robust-
ness, and opportuneness mitigates for no intervention (level 5). The enhanced robustness resulting from these decisions is
obtained at the expense of guaranteeing lower utility, as understood from the trade-off between robustness and utility
(Fig. 1). The picture remains the same at high robustness ða^ ¼ 1Þ, and correspondingly low utility.
5.2. Case 2
Let’s consider a case whose prognosis is quite different from the case in Section 5.1: a male, aged 55, group-1 HDL, group-
5 blood pressure, diabetic smoker whose current (pre-intervention) LDL level is group 5. We will again consider the info-gap
analysis for various estimated (but uncertain) costs of intervention, together with uncertainty in the probability of a cardiac
event and uncertainty in the patient’s utility coefﬁcients for disease and health.
Results for four different estimated costs of intervention are shown in Figs. 8 and 9. The nominal best-estimated utilities
of the options—at zero-robustness—are lower than in case 1 (Section 5.1, Figs. 6 and 7) at all estimated costs. Likewise, at any
given level of utility, the robustnesses are lower in case 2 than in case 1 for all estimated costs. The crossing of robustness
occurs as in case 1, though at lower robustness and lower utility.ce ranks of LDL options for case 1, based on robustness, from Figs. 6 and 7.
No robustness a^ ¼ 0 Moderate robustness a^ ¼ 0:5 High robustness a^ ¼ 1
1  2  3  4  5 1  2  3  4  5 1  2  3  4  5
5  4  3  2  1 ð3  1Þ  2  4  5 3  2  1  4  5
5  4  3  2  1 3  4  ð2  1  5Þ 3  2  4  ð1  5Þ
5  4  3  2  1 5  4  3  2  1 3  5  4  2  1
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Fig. 8. Case 2. Robustness and opportuneness vs. desired utility for case in Section 5.2. Patient’s estimated utilities are ~u ¼ ½1; 0:5. q is the unit vector.
‘c ¼ 5. f ¼ 0 (left), f ¼ 0:1 (right).
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Fig. 9. Case 2. Robustness and opportuneness vs. desired utility for case in Section 5.2. Patient’s estimated utilities are ~u ¼ ½1; 0:5. q is the unit vector.
‘c ¼ 5. f ¼ 0:2 (left), f ¼ 0:4 (right).
1056 Y. Ben-Haim et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 50 (2009) 1046–1065The picture which emerges for this case, in Table 3, is somewhat different than for case 1 in Table 2. In case 2, as in case 1,
if there is no cost for intervention ðf ¼ 0Þ, then the nominal, zero-robustness ða^ ¼ 0Þ preference is for reducing the LDL con-
centration to level 1. However, the robustness curves rapidly converge at f ¼ 0, so that at moderate and high robustness,
a^ ¼ 0:5 and a^ ¼ 1, there is no preference among the options in terms of robustness, and very little preference based on
opportuneness, though the opportuneness curves are separated and do not cross one another. If there is no cost of interven-
tion, then one presumably would not intervene in the absence of additional considerations. At low or moderate cost of inter-
vention, f ¼ 0:1 or f ¼ 0:2, the nominal, zero-robustness preference is for minimizing the LDL level. At high cost, f ¼ 0:4, the
zero-robustness preference is indifferent between all levels except ‘ ¼ 2 which is less preferred; again one would presum-
ably not intervene. However, at moderate or high robustness (a^ ¼ 0:5 or a^ ¼ 1) and positive cost ðf P 0:1Þ, the preference is
for ‘ ¼ 5, which is the patient’s current state, so intervention is not indicated here either.
We see here, as in case 1, the strong effect of considering robustness to uncertainty in cost and the other factors of the
estimated decision model.
5.3. Case 3
In this example we explore the effect of age and estimated cost of intervention. Case 3 is a non-smoking non-diabetic
male with group-5 HDL and group-1 blood pressure, at pre-intervention LDL level 5. We compare ages 35, 55 and 75.
Table 3
Preference ranks of LDL options for case 2, based on robustness, from Figs. 8 and 9.
Cost f No robustness a^ ¼ 0 Moderate robustness a^ ¼ 0:5 High robustness a^ ¼ 1
0.0 1  2  3  4  5 1  2  3  4  5 1  2  3  4  5
0.1 1  ð3  2Þ  4  5 5  4  3  2  1 5  4  3  2  1
0.2 1  3  2  4  5 5  4  3  2  1 5  4  3  2  1
0.4 1  3  4  5  2 5  4  3  2  1 5  4  3  2  1
Y. Ben-Haim et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 50 (2009) 1046–1065 1057Consider ﬁrst the robustness curves without intervention cost, Fig. 10 (ages 35 and 75), and the left frame of Fig. 6 (age
55). The main effects of advancing age are to reduce the zero-robustness nominal utility, which shifts the curves to the left,
and to substantially reduce the robustness at any lower utility, which lowers the robustness curves.
Similar conclusions hold at moderate estimated cost of intervention, f ¼ 0:2, as seen in Fig. 11 and the left frame of Fig. 7.
Furthermore, the curves have moved with respect to one another sufﬁciently so that the preference rankings are different at
the different ages, as illustrated in Table 4, part of which (age 55) is reproduced from Table 2. The nominal, zero-robustness
recommendation is the same for all three ages: no intervention. At moderate robustness, a^ ¼ 0:5, the recommendations are:
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Fig. 10. Case 3. Robustness and opportuneness vs. desired utility for case in Section 5.3. Patient’s estimated utilities are ~u ¼ ½1; 0:5. q is the unit vector.
‘c ¼ 5, f ¼ 0. Age 35 (left), age 75 (right).
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Fig. 11. Case 3. Robustness and opportuneness vs. desired utility for case in Section 5.3. Patient’s estimated utilities are ~u ¼ ½1; 0:5. q is the unit vector.
‘c ¼ 5, f ¼ 0:2. Age 35 (left), age 75 (right).
Table 4
Preference ranks of LDL options for case 3, based on robustness and Figs. 10 and 11, and the left frame of Fig. 7. Results for f ¼ 0:2.
Age (y) No robustness a^ ¼ 0 Moderate robustness a^ ¼ 0:5 High robustness a^ ¼ 1
35 5  4  3  2  1 5  4  3  2  1 ð3  4Þ  ð2  5Þ  1
55 5  4  3  2  1 3  4  ð2  1  5Þ 3  2  4  ð1  5Þ
75 ð5  4  3Þ  ð1  2Þ 1  3  ð2  4Þ  5 5  4  3  2  1
1058 Y. Ben-Haim et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 50 (2009) 1046–1065move to LDL level 3, while the oldest age group does not mandate intervention. We see in this example, as before, the strong
effect of considering uncertainty in the underlying data and models.
5.4. Case 4
This example is a non-smoking non-diabetic aged-55 woman with HDL level 5, blood pressure group 1, and pre-interven-
tion LDL level 5. This is the same as the case in Section 5.1 except for the sex of the patient, so the ﬁgures for comparison are
Figs. 6 and 7 and Table 2.
Figs. 12 and 13 shows results for four different estimated costs of intervention. The most striking result is the far lower


































LDL: 100 − 129
LDL: 130 − 159
LDL: 160 − 189
LDL: >= 190


































LDL: 100 − 129
LDL: 130 − 159
LDL: 160 − 189
LDL: >= 190
Fig. 12. Case 4. Robustness and opportuneness vs. desired utility for case in Section 5.4. Patient’s estimated utilities are ~u ¼ ½1; 0:5. q is the unit vector.
‘c ¼ 5, f ¼ 0 (left), f ¼ 0:1 (right).
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Fig. 13. Case 4. Robustness and opportuneness vs. desired utility for case in Section 5.4. Patient’s estimated utilities are ~u ¼ ½1; 0:5. q is the unit vector.
‘c ¼ 5, f ¼ 0:2 (left), f ¼ 0:4 (right)
Table 5
Preference ranks of LDL options for case 4, based on robustness and Figs. 12 and 13.
Cost f No robustness a^ ¼ 0 Moderate robustness a^ ¼ 0:08 High robustness a^ ¼ 0:2
0.0 1  2  3  ð4  5Þ 1  2  3  ð4  5Þ 1  2  3  4  5
0.1 5  4  3  2  1 1  3  ð2  5  4Þ 5  4  3  2  1
0.2 5  4  3  2  1 5  ð3  4Þ  1  2 5  4  3  2  1
0.4 5  4  3  2  1 5  4  3  2  1 5  4  3  2  1
Y. Ben-Haim et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 50 (2009) 1046–1065 1059We summarize the results of Figs. 12 and 13 in Table 5, which should be compared to Table 2. ‘Moderate’ and ‘High’
robustnesses are lower for female than male patients, but the interventions are roughly similar. At zero-robustness, both
male and female cases call for no intervention if there is even low cost of intervention (f P 0:1Þ, and lowering LDL to level
1 if f ¼ 0. At moderate robustness ða^ ¼ 0:08Þ the recommendation for females is for no intervention at high cost (f ¼ 0:2 or
f ¼ 0:4), and lowering to level 1 at zero or low cost (f ¼ 0 or f ¼ 0:1). At high robustness ða^ ¼ 0:2Þ the recommendation for
females is strong intervention at zero cost, and no intervention otherwise.
6. Discussion: medical guidelines
Clinical guidelines have become central to medical practice. The physician is charged with evaluating a guideline’s rele-
vance for each patient, and knowing when and how to recommend a deviation from the guideline. Furthermore, the patient
should be able to evaluate the guideline and express individual preferences. Missing from the process of considering clinical
guidelines is the diverse and partly non-probabilistic uncertainty facing both physician and patient. Info-gap analysis explic-
itly incorporates this severe uncertainty into the decision making process, thus respecting individual judgment, variation in
preference, and autonomy. A methodology is presented here for employing guidelines, in light of uncertain relevance of pop-
ulation studies to individual patients, uncertainty in patient preferences among outcomes, and uncertain cost of interven-
tion. The uncertainties represented by info-gap models are both in the values of parameters and in the shapes of functions.
Info-gap robustness and opportuneness functions are useful for evaluating and selecting therapies. Robustness is deﬁned
as the greatest uncertainty at which acceptable outcomes will occur. Large robustness is preferred over small robustness,
generating preferences among available therapies. Opportuneness is deﬁned as the lowest uncertainty which is needed in
order to enable a windfall outcome. Small values for the opportuneness function are preferred over large values, also gen-
erating preferences among options which need not agree with robustness-based preferences. The opportuneness preferences
can be used to resolve ambiguous robustness preferences.
We have illustrated the use of robustness and opportuneness for selecting LDL levels in conjunction with guidelines, for
plausible clinical situations. The following conclusions are suggested.Table 6
Estimated c coefﬁcients, ~c, for predicting cardiac event using LDL-C categories, based on Wilson et al. [33].
Symbol Variable Men Women
~c1 Age (y) 0.04808 0.33994
~c2 Age-squared (y2) 0z 0.0027
HDL-C (mg/dL)
~c3 <35 0.48598 0.88121
~c4 35–44 0.21643 0.36312
~c5 45–49 0H 0.19247
~c6 50–59 0.0471 0H
~c7 P60 0.3419 0.35404
Blood pressure
~c8 Optimal 0.02642 0.51204
~c9 Normal 0H 0H
~c10 High normal 0.30104 0.03484
~c11 Stage I hypertension 0.55714 0.28533
~c12 Stage II–IV hypertension 0.65107 0.50403
~c13 Diabetes 0.42146 0.61313
~c14 Smoker 0.54377 0.29737
LDL-C (mg/dL)
~c15 <100 0.69281 0.42616
~c16 100–129 0H 0H
~c17 130–159 0.00389 0.01366
~c18 160–189 0.26755 0.26948
~c19 P190 0.56705 0.33251
The values marked ‘w’ are ‘‘referent” values which are zero by deﬁnition. The value marked ‘’ is zero by deﬁnition: the age-squared term is not included in
the regression for men.
1060 Y. Ben-Haim et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 50 (2009) 1046–1065 Decisions using guidelines and best estimates of expected utility are sometimes supported by analysis of robustness to,
and opportuneness from, uncertainty. That is, ranking the options in terms of estimated expected utility is sometimes
the same as ranking the options in terms of robustness and opportuneness. When this occurs, the robustness and oppor-
tuneness analysis provides additional support for the guideline-based decision.
 Combined with guidelines, info-gap analysis can increase conﬁdence in the choice of treatment. The degree of conﬁdence
in attaining an outcome is quantiﬁed by robustness: the numerical evaluation of the robustness indicates how wrong the
estimates can be without jeopardizing one’s aspiration for quality of outcome. When the robustness is low, as occurs in
some cases, the decision maker will perhaps look further before deciding. Or, less risk-averse decision makers may use the
opportuneness function to identify opportune therapies.
 The analysis helps resolve ambiguity. In some situations the best-estimated outcome is essentially the same for several
therapies (righthand frame of Fig. 6 or Fig. 9, or the left hand frame of Fig. 10). One may choose the most robust option,
which may differ from the guideline recommendation. For example, the nominal, guideline, recommendation in the right-
hand Fig. 6 is for no intervention ð‘ ¼ 5Þ, but the nominal preference for this choice is weak. The robustness curves cross
one another at low robustness in this ﬁgure and the ‘ ¼ 5 option rapidly becomes substantially less robust than the other
options, suggesting that the nominal recommendation is not suited to this case.
 The opportuneness function can be used to resolve situations where robustness does not establish unambiguous prefer-
ences. The left hand frame of Fig. 13 is a case in point. The robustness curves are very close to one another over much of
the utility-range, resulting in ambiguous robustness-preferences. However, the opportuneness curves are well separated,
indicating strong opportuneness-preference for LDL level 5. The decision makers may choose to resolve the robustness-
ambiguity by selecting the greater opportuneness of non-intervention (level 5) in this situation.
 The analysis provides guidance when judgment suggests deviation from the guideline. The left hand frame of Fig. 9 illus-
trates this. The best estimates indicate guideline-based preference for the lowest LDL level. However, as always, best-esti-
mated outcomes have zero-robustness against uncertainty (Fig. 1). The left hand frame of Fig. 9 shows that LDL level 5 has
far greater robustness than level 1, over much of the utility range. When the decision makers feel substantial uncertainty,
they may opt for level 5, rather than 1, due to greater robustness of this option. Additionally, exogenous considerations of
collateral medical impacts may be folded into preferring level 5, supported by greater robustness of this option.
Conventional application of clinical guidelines is often appropriate. A robust approach expands the usefulness of guide-
lines to individual patients and provides increased conﬁdence in outcomes when dealing with diverse and substantial uncer-
tainty. Further, coupling opportuneness to robustness reveals potential for better-than-expected outcomes. Additionally,
uncertainty analysis may provide support when the physician’s judgment indicates deviation from the guidelines. Finally,
the value of clinical guidelines is enhanced by the availability of quantitative decision-theoretical tools, suggesting that
guidelines are amenable to computer-based decision-support technology.
We make no claim of optimality for the info-gap analysis developed here. For decisions of such complexity, and with
uncertainties of such diversity, we know of no feasible criterion for optimality of a decision methodology. We claim only that
diverse and clinically realistic information and uncertainty can be efﬁciently and meaningfully managed with info-gap the-
ory. Furthermore, just as we have combined non-probabilistic info-gap tools with probabilistic ones (expected utility theory)
our contention is that the combination of tools can prove useful in situations such as clinical decision making. The search for
criteria of optimality of a decision tool is of prime importance. We suggest that methodological pluralism is a possible guide
in this search.
7. Discussion: info-gap theory and other methods
In the spirit of methodological pluralismwe will brieﬂy compare info-gap robust-satisﬁcing and opportune-windfalling to
four different decision methodologies: robust Bayesian analysis, min–max, probability bounds analysis, and coherent lower
previsions. Our comparison will concentrate on three questions. The ﬁrst question is epistemic: what information is needed
in order to implement the methods. The second question is behavioral: what aspirations or requirements does the decision
maker bring to the decision process, and how is the outcome of the decision evaluated? The third question is: how can the
methods can be combined in a hybrid analysis, which is often a fruitful approach. We will not explicitly discuss axiomatic
questions (what is the foundational structure of the method?), or questions of normative rationality (what philosophy of
good decision making does the method entail?), though our discussion will sometimes intrude on these issues. It is hoped
that this discussion will both clarify the nature of info-gap theory, and encourage researchers to study its relation to other
theories. Klir writes that ‘‘It is not clear . . . whether the information-gap conception of uncertainty . . . can be formalized with-
in [Generalized Information Theory]. This is an open research question.” (italics in the original) [3, p. 418].
Robust Bayesian decisions. In a nutshell, robust Bayesian methods embed ordinary Bayesian methods in an analysis
where some or all of the functions involved are uncertain. More speciﬁcally, a function—usually a prior probability or some-
times the loss function or the conditional probability—is replaced by a set of possible functions. The robustness analysis then
evaluates the stability of the decision, or of some function of the decision such as a Bayesian risk. This can be done in many
different ways [45,46]; Jack Good has suggested that there are 46,656 types of Bayesian [47, Chapter 4]. One particularly
Bayesian version of robust Bayesian analysis is to put a prior probability on the set of functions, and then perform an ordin-
ary Bayesian analysis on this extended problem.
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an unbounded family of nested sets of possible realizations. The difference is knowing the size of this set, which is either
explicit or implicit in the Bayesian approach. Explicit knowledge of the size is based on judgment: one chooses the size
to be reasonable or plausible. Implicit knowledge is manifested in pragmatically varying the size to see how the robustness
changes. This is not all that different in spirit from the info-gap robustness and opportuneness functions, which ask: how
large can the uncertain set be without jeopardizing a critical requirement (robustness), or how large must the set be in order
to enable a windfall aspiration (opportuneness).
The strictly Bayesian version of robust Bayesian analysis—choose a prior probability distribution on the set of uncertain
functions—is epistemically very different from the info-gap approach, in which uncertainty is represented by sets of func-
tions without any measure functions at all. As Levi pointed out: ‘‘Strict Bayesians are legitimately challenged to tell us where
they get their numbers.” [48, p. 387].
Behavior. Bayesians are very concerned with making good decisions, and thus pay careful attention to the choice of the
loss or gain function. When a risk, or regret, or other loss function is used, it is minimized; when a beneﬁt, or utility, or other
gain function is used, it is maximized. This differs from both the robust-satisﬁcing and the opportune-windfalling
approaches.
Robust-satisﬁcing is motivated by a behavioral orientation which says: a particular quality of outcome is essential, and
any decision which achieves at least this critical level is acceptable even if it is less than the putative maximum. Satisﬁcers do
not attempt to optimize the outcome. Psychologically, ‘more’ can be ‘less’ at the end of the day [49]. If the critical level is less
than the maximum, then there will usually be a multiplicity of actions which achieve the critical level. Furthermore, a sat-
isﬁcing action may be more likely than a purportedly optimizing action to achieve the critical outcome [5, section 11.4; 50].
The robust-satisﬁcing approach seeks an action which satisﬁes the critical requirement with maximum immunity to uncer-
tainty. What is maximized is robustness, not outcome.
In the opportune-windfalling approach the behavior is more ambitious, seeking to facilitate favorable, better-than-antic-
ipated outcomes. The decision maker aspires to windfalls and chooses an action which enables (though cannot guarantee) a
wonderful outcome at the lowest possible level of uncertainty. What is maximized is the opportuneness of the decision to
exploit favorable uncertainty, and not the outcome.
Hybridization. The Bayesian uses judgment to choose a set of uncertain functions. Such judgments may be subject to
uncertainty, implying that the set of uncertain functions may itself be uncertain. An info-gap model can represent uncer-
tainty in this set. That is, the elements of the info-gap model are sets. The info-gap robustness analysis asks: how wrong
can the prior choice of the uncertainty set be, and the outcome requirements are satisﬁed? The info-gap opportuneness anal-
ysis asks: how wrong must the initial set be in order for windfall to be possible?
Min–max decisions. The min–max approach identiﬁes a set of possible contingencies or models or relevant functions and
seeks the decision which minimizes the worst (maximal) loss on this set. (The max–min approach maximizes the lowest
(minimal) gain when considering beneﬁts rather than losses.) This concept is implicit in many robust Bayesian realizations,
and many of our comments there apply here as well. Epistemically, the info-gap and min–max approaches are similar in rep-
resenting uncertainty without measure functions, though the min–max approach requires the choice of a speciﬁc set. The
hybridization of a min–max with an info-gap approach is often attractive, as discussed in connection with Bayesian methods.
Indeed, Wald’s work in the early 1940s on min–max considers sets of uncertain probability distributions [51].
Behavior. We will discuss two concepts: the observational equivalence of min–max with info-gap robust-satisﬁcing, and
the behavioral difference of these methods [52].
Observational equivalence: Suppose a robust-satisﬁcing decision maker must choose between two options, D1 and D2, and
requires an outcome no worse than Lc in Fig. 14. This leads the robust-satisﬁcer to choose decision D1, which is more robustFig. 14. Crossing robustness curves, illustrating the observational equivalence and behavioral difference between min-maxing and robust-satisﬁcing.
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who believes that the horizon of uncertainty is a1, because at this level of uncertainty the maximum potential loss from
D1 is less than from D2. Conversely, a min-maxing decision maker who believes that a1 is the true horizon of uncertainty
would likewise choose D1 over D2. An observer could describe this by supposing the decision maker is a robust-satisﬁcer
whose requirement is Lc. In short, either strategy can be used to describe observed behavior by ascribing particular beliefs
to the decision maker. In other words, the modelling of decision-behavior under uncertainty is under-determined in choos-
ing between robust-satisﬁcing and min-maxing.
Behavioral difference: Suppose a min-maxing decision maker believes that the horizon of uncertainty can be as large as a2
in Fig. 14, but no larger. The min-maxer will prefer D2, whose loss can be as large as Lm, but less than the maximum potential
loss of D1. Suppose a robust-satisﬁcing decision maker can accept a loss as large as Lc, but no larger. This robust-satisﬁcing
decision maker will prefer D1 over D2 since D1 can tolerate greater uncertainty for achieving this requirement. The robust-
satisﬁcer will choose D1 over D2 even if the min-maxer has convinced the robust-satisﬁcer that a2 is the true horizon of
uncertainty. In short, when the robustness curves for two decisions cross one another, a min-maxer and robust-satisﬁcer
may disagree about the decision, depending on their beliefs and requirements.
In conclusion, the observational equivalence between min-maxing and robust-satisﬁcing means that modellers can use
either strategy to describe observed behavior of decision makers. In contrast, the behavioral differencemeans that actual deci-
sion makers will not necessarily be indifferent between these strategies, and will choose a strategy according to their beliefs
and aspirations.
The concepts of observational equivalence and behavioral difference have been noted before, in different terms. Walley
writes [53, p. 10]:
Every [Dempster-Shafer] belief function can be represented as a lower envelope of a set of probability measures. This is
merely a mathematical representation, however; it is misleading and unnecessary to regard a belief function as a lower
bound for some unknown probability measure. In the same way, every coherent lower prevision can be represented as a
lower envelope of a set of linear previsions, but this is no reason to regard the lower prevision as a model for partial infor-
mation about an unknown linear prevision.
The observational equivalence of min-maxing and robust-satisﬁcing asserts that either can be used as a mathematical
representation of the other. The behavioral difference between these methods asserts that real decision makers with speciﬁc
beliefs and requirements need not be indifferent between these methods.
Probability bounds analysis. A probability box, or P-box for short, is an interval of cumulative (probability) distribution
functions (cdf’s). In its simplest form a P-box is speciﬁed by a left-bounding and a right-bounding cdf. Uncertainty is ana-
lyzed by propagating the P-box through the equations which describe the system, resulting in probability bounds on out-
comes. P-boxes are useful when the analyst is unsure about the precise cdf to use. Furthermore, convenient generic
software is available for implementing P-box analyses [54].
The P-box method belongs to the family of non-measure-theoretic set-based representations of uncertainty, and thus is
epistemically similar to info-gap theory. Since an info-gap model of uncertainty is an unbounded family of nested sets of func-
tions, one can formulate an info-gap model for uncertainty in cdf’s as a family of nested P-boxes [55]. An ordinary P-box anal-
ysis requires choosing a speciﬁc size for the P-box, while the info-gap model does not specify the size. Nonetheless it is clear
that the methods can be combined in a hybrid analysis, as has been done in a study of portfolio investment [31]. The P-box
method is behaviorally neutral or non-committal, unlike Bayesian analysis which usually entails some type of risk function,
or info-gap analysis which supports robust-satisﬁcing and opportune-windfalling. A P-box analysis can be integrated into
either an outcome-optimizing analysis (e.g. maximizing expected utility or minimizing Bayesian risk) or an info-gap satis-
ﬁcing or windfalling analysis.
Coherent lower previsions.Much has been written on lower previsions; a sketchy mention of central ideas will have to
sufﬁce. A gamble is a utility function, XðxÞ, which depends on an uncertain state of the world x. That is, utility XðxÞ results
from state x. A lower prevision PðXÞ can be interpreted as the supremum buying price that an agent is willing to pay for the
gamble X. An upper prevision, PðXÞ is the inﬁnum selling price for the gamble, and is related to the lower prevision as
PðXÞ ¼ PðXÞ [53]. One measure of the imprecision, incompleteness, or internal conﬂict of the agent’s information is the
difference between the upper and the lower previsions, PðXÞ  PðXÞ. The lower prevision is ‘coherent’ if it satisﬁes several
properties, whose meaning is that (1) sure losses are not acceptable, (2) a gamble is acceptable if it is sure to be better than
another acceptable gamble, and (3) a positive linear combination of acceptable gambles is also acceptable [56].
Epistemics. Any coherent lower prevision can be expressed as the lower envelope of a closed convex set of linear previ-
sions (which are ordinary statistical expectations) [53, p. 12]. This connects the lower prevision to a set of uncertain alter-
natives, thus establishing a similarity to info-gap models of uncertainty which are families of sets. However, an info-gap
model of uncertainty is not a single set, but rather an unbounded family of nested sets of uncertain alternatives. While a
closed and bounded set has a worst case, an info-gap model does not (except a vacuous case which bounds the entire uni-
verse of possibilities, if such a case exists at all). Thus the set uncertainty in info-gap theory is more extreme than the set
uncertainty to which coherent lower previsions can be related.
In addition, the epistemic starting point for coherent lower previsions is (usually) a set of ‘‘judgments and expressions of
uncertainty” [53, p. 8] such as ‘A ismore likely than B’ or ‘If A then probably B’, and so on. The process of ‘natural extension’ then
constructs the coherent lower prevision from the uncertainty statements. This can be done by ﬁnding the set of linear previ-
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cludes speciﬁcation of the unbounded family of sets which make up the info-gap model. (This suggests a possible hybridiza-
tion which we will mention shortly.) In short, uncertainty is represented by real-valued functions in the theory of coherent
lower previsions, while in info-gap theory this task is assumed by a set-valued function (the info-gap model of uncertainty).
Another epistemic distinction between the theory of lower previsions and info-gap theory has to do with imprecision. In
the former theory imprecision is evaluated as the difference between the upper and lower previsions. This difference equals
zero in the Bayesian case when probabilities are known precisely. The imprecision that is quantiﬁed by the lower and upper
previsions represents ‘‘incompleteness or conﬂict in the available information” [53, p. 10], which would have to be resolved
before implementing a Bayesian analysis. An info-gap model of uncertainty represents incompleteness or conﬂict in the
available information much less informatively, by deﬁning a family of sets of possibilities. For instance, suppose we have
evidence provided by experts. The evidence is perhaps in part conﬂicting, and other experts might give different evidence.
The incompleteness and conﬂict of the evidence can be represented by an info-gap model whose elements are sets of pos-
sible evidence, of which the actual evidence in hand is one such set. In both theories the imprecision is propagated through
to the decision, though the nature of that propagation, and the impact on the decision, can be quite different.
Behavior. The behavior of the decision maker is a central concern in the theory of lower and upper previsions, where the
interpretation ‘‘in terms of buying and selling prices for gambles or in terms of their implications in other decision problems
. . . is sufﬁcient to justify the axioms and calculus of the theory.” [53, p. 10]. This behavioral interpretation is normative. It
identiﬁes the characteristics of a decision procedure which is rational in the sense of conforming to rules of consistency
for achieving goals desired by the agent: a rational agent should not accept a sure loss, etc. This approach to the behavioral
formulation of a decision theory is in the tradition of Ramsey, von Neumann and Morgenstern, Savage, and other early think-
ers for whom rationality is manifested in the concept of ordered preferences together with some form of logical consistency
of preferences (not to imply that these thinkers agreed on all points).
Stated differently, the behavioral interpretation of coherent lower previsions is foundational. This differs from the behav-
ioral interpretation of info-gap robust-satisﬁcing and opportune-windfalling which put major emphasis on evaluating the
conﬁdence in, or feasibility of, required or aspired outcomes, and revising these requirements or aspirations as a result of
analysis. Robust-satisﬁcing and opportune-windfalling can certainly be related to a foundational logic of preferences. Like-
wise, a decision analysis based on coherent lower previsions can enable the decision maker to start over or revise judgments
when outcomes or implications are unacceptable. However, one attraction of info-gap satisﬁcing and windfalling for actual
decision makers is that info-gap theory directly and immediately incorporates outcome-aspirations in an iterative analysis of
uncertainty.
Hybridization. Info-gap theory hybridizes easily and naturally with many disparate decision theories, and can be done in
many different ways. We will suggest here two possible hybridizations with lower previsions.
An analysis with lower previsions typically starts by identifying judgments of uncertainty which the decision maker be-
lieves. The procedure of ‘natural extension’ enables the computation of new lower previsions based on these judgments of
uncertainty. One can imagine situations in which the list of uncertainty judgments is itself uncertain. This may be due to
‘‘framing effects”: the way verbal judgments are phrased can be inﬂuenced by the way in which information is presented.
Or it may be due to subtle distinctions which escape the decision maker. For instance, the statement ‘If A then probably
B’ is not the same as the statement ‘Probably A, hence B’. However, the decision maker may not distinguish between them
or consider them both. Or, uncertainty in the list of uncertainty judgments may result from uncertainty about the situation.
For instance, in the Cuban missile crisis Kennedy’s advisors may have been honestly uncertain if they should tell the pres-
ident ‘Russia probably doeswant war between Cuba and the US’ or ‘Russia probably does notwant war between Cuba and the
US’. (See [32] for an info-gap analysis of uncertain knowledge about the preferences of an adversary.) In short, the setMmay
be uncertain. We may not know what alternative sets the decision maker might induce if the information is presented or
cogitated differently. One can formulate an info-gap model for uncertainty in the natural extension of the uncertainty judg-
ments. This info-gap model is a family of nested sets whose elements are themselves sets of probability distributions. One
then asks the info-gap robustness question: how wrong can the decision maker’s actual speciﬁed set, M, be, and any pro-
posed inference or decision will lead to an acceptable outcome? The analogous windfalling question is also relevant.
The other hybridization of info-gap theory with coherent lower previsions is more direct. One can construct an info-gap
model for uncertainty in the lower prevision function itself, PðXÞ. The lower prevision inference is again embedded in an info-
gap robustness or opportuneness analysis.
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Appendix A. Evaluating the robustness and opportuneness functions
Robustness. Let lða; ‘Þ denote the inner minimum in the deﬁnition of the robustness function, Eq. (8). The robustness is
the greatest horizon of uncertainty, a, up to which lða; ‘ÞP Ec. The uncertainty sets, Uða; ~cÞ, Uuða; ~uÞ and Uiða; ~uiÞ, become
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monotonically as a increases. Hence the robustness is the greatest value of a at which lða; ‘Þ ¼ Ec. Finally, this implies that
lða; ‘Þ is the inverse of the robustness function: a plot of lða; ‘Þ on the horizontal axis, vs. a on the vertical axis, is identical to
a plot of Ec horizontally vs. a^ð‘;EcÞ vertically. This is the basis for evaluating the robustness function.
One can readily derive the following expression for lða; ‘Þ:lða; ‘Þ ¼ 1 SeGþc
T ~cþacT b
 
ð1þ aÞ~ue þ Se
GþcT ~cþacT b
hð1 aÞ~uh þ ð1þ aÞj‘ ‘cju0 ð15ÞThe dependence of the righthand side on the chosen LDL level, ‘, arises through c. b is the vector whose elements are
bi ¼ j~cijqi.
Opportuneness. Let Mða; ‘Þ denote the inner maximum in the deﬁnition of the opportuneness function in Eq. (10). By an
argument analogous to the one about lða; ‘Þ we conclude thatMða; ‘Þ is the inverse of the opportuneness function. That is, a
plot of Mða; ‘Þ on the horizontal axis vs. a on the vertical axis, is identical to a plot of Ew horizontally vs. b^ð‘;EwÞ vertically.
This is the basis for evaluating the opportuneness. One ﬁnds:Mða; ‘Þ ¼ 1 SeGþc
T ~cacT b
 
hð1 aÞ~ue þ Se
GþcT ~cacT b ð1þ aÞ~uh þ hð1 aÞj‘ ‘cju0 ð16ÞReferences
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